Louisiana's Military Heritage:

     Battles, Campaigns, and Maneuvers

The crisis of secession is one that goes back to the very founding of the United States in 1776 when Thomas Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration of Independence was edited to mollify Southern colonies in the area of slavery.  During the nullification crisis of 1832, hot-headed South Carolinians defied a federal tariff, declaring it null and void within that state's boundaries.  A special legislative convention called for military preparations to be made and threatened to take the Palmetto State out of the Union should the federal government attempt to enforce the tariff.  President Andrew Jackson threatened to hang the nullifiers, dispatching military reinforcements, but a compromise tariff passed by Congress defused the situation.  When a sectional crisis erupted again in 1850, Southern states again threatened to leave the Union.  President Zachary Taylor, himself a Southerner from Louisiana and—like Jackson—of a military background, threatened to hang all "damned traitors" and any member of Congress who dared advocate secession from the floors of the U.S. House of Representatives or Senate.  Once again, though, compromise won the day and the Union persevered.

On November 06, 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected President of the United States of America.  The debate over slavery had reached a fevered pitch.  The election of a perceived abolitionist bewildered and infuriated Southerners, particularly since Lincoln's name had not even appeared on the ballot in ten Southern states.  To the average citizen, it seemed a betrayal of democracy.  To the fire-eating political extremists in the South, it provided an excuse.

 

Governor Thomas Overton Moore of Louisiana called the state legislature into special session for early December after receiving numerous petitions and appeals.  When they convened in Baton Rouge on December 10, secession was a foregone conclusion, though there was still significant opposition to it and strong support for a "cooperationist" approach.  The legislators authorized Moore to hold an election of delegates for a convention to decide the question of whether or not Louisiana should remain in the Union.  They also approved his request for the creation of a military board, placing the Governor at its head and appropriating $500,000 to arm and equip volunteer militia companies throughout the state.  Each parish (county) was authorized to have at least one company of either infantry or cavalry consisting of a minimum of 32 men.  Though they set the date for the election of delegates on January 07, 1861, they ignored the state's constitution by refusing to put the question of such a convention to a popular vote.  As one historian would later note, the legislature itself took "the first illegal and revolutionary step towards secession."

Governor Thomas Overton Moore Photo courtesy of the Louisiana State Museum.

On December 20, 1860, South Carolina severed all ties to the Union and the political debate in Louisiana heated up.  One hundred twenty-three delegates were elected around the state on January 07 and the convention was scheduled to begin on January 23.  Prior to the election, public opinion had begun to swing.  Voters in north-central Louisiana had been for a large part staunchly Unionist in their views.  Even voters in New Orleans had been conflicted.  A large foreign population existed there along with families from the North, all of whom had brought manufacturing and mercantile skills to the city.  Cooperationist efforts were made toward establishing the Crescent City as a "free city," thus avoiding the pitfalls of war and the disruption of commerce.  Business, after all, was more important than slavery and that latter institution had actually been in decline in the city in recent years (though the record amounts of cotton and sugar that was shipped through its port was a direct result of slaves found elsewhere in the state).  But in spite of all of this, those in favor of disunion saw their numbers grow steadily.

Though the state legislature had taken the first step toward secession, it was Louisiana's governor that seemed to run headlong into the arms of open rebellion.  His inaugural speech just one year earlier had already painted him as an ardent secessionist.  With the convention opening in just two weeks' time, Moore took the initiative.  On January 09, 1861, just two days after the election, he issued orders for state troops in New Orleans to board the steamer NATIONAL.  Only once they were aboard ship and away up the river did they learn of any details about this unexpected call to arms.

Their destination:  Baton Rouge.

Their mission:  the seizure of the U.S. arsenal and military barracks located there.

Even as the NATIONAL chugged against the currents of the Mississippi as she moved northward toward Baton Rouge, Moore was not idle.  He instructed Colonel Braxton Bragg, one of the advisors on his staff, to prepare to move against the arsenal.  Bragg assembled three companies of state militia from Baton Rouge which were joined by other companies from nearby Grosse Tete, West Baton Rouge, and Point Coupee.  The troops set up camp along North Boulevard in Baton Rouge just over a mile from the arsenal and in the vicinity of the capitol house.  Early on the morning of January 10, Bragg demanded the surrender of the barracks and arsenal.

Major Joseph A. Haskin, USA, who commanded the small detachment in charge of the barracks and the arsenal, was a decorated veteran of the Mexican War.  He was not one to be intimidated by poorly trained, rag-tag militia assembled from the rural countryside surrounding Baton Rouge.  Haskin flatly refused to surrender his post and instead ordered his men to sight a cannon down the length of Third Street toward the capitol and the route of direct approach for the militia.  No one chose to test the implied threat.

 

The Baton Rouge Barracks were designed to house 1,000 U.S. Army troops when built in 1819. Photo courtesy of Louisiana Office of Tourism.

The Baton Rouge Barracks—now known as the Pentagon Barracks—as viewed today from the top of the Louisiana State Capitol building.

Bragg proceeded to attempt negotiating with Haskin for a peaceful surrender and was joined by Richard Taylor, a delegate to the upcoming convention and advisor to the Governor whose father, President Zachary Taylor, had once commanded this very post.  In the midst of negotiations, the NATIONAL arrived on the riverfront and the troops from New Orleans began to disembark.  Rather than rejoicing at the sight of reinforcements, some of the local units—who had been faced down by a single cannon and a grand total of eighty armed men—were insulted that New Orleans troops had been brought in.  Two companies marched to the governor's mansion, stacked arms, and resigned while others moved out of the theater of operations (and out of danger) without offering resignations.  The remainder of the local companies joined with the well-dressed and well-drilled New Orleans units after breakfast and moved down Third Street in the direction of the arsenal.

 

The last remaining building of the Old Arsenal as seen today on the grounds of the capitol gardens in Baton Rouge.

At the barracks, sixty men under the command of Major Haskin prepared to fight.  Nearby, another twenty men of the ordnance corps manned the arsenal under the command of Lieutenant J.W. Todd.  Negotiations continued throughout the day with Bragg and Taylor imploring Haskin to see reason and avoid needless bloodshed.  Faced with superior numbers, Haskin finally relented and surrendered the installation at 5:00 p.m. that day.  As a result, the State of Louisiana gained "50,000 stands of small arms, four howitzers, 20 pieces of heavy ordnance, one battery of 6-pounders, one battery of 12-pounders, 300 barrels of powder, and a quantity of ammunition."

Louisiana had just taken military action against the government of the United States; in every aspect, a premeditated act of open rebellion.

This, however, was not the end but rather the beginning.  Even as Bragg and Taylor negotiated the stand-off in Baton Rouge with Haskin, troops of the Louisiana militia under the command of Major Paul E. Théard were moving downriver from New Orleans aboard the steamboat YANKEE.  Approximately seventy (70) miles southward, two forts stood guarding the approach to New Orleans from the mouth of the Mississippi River:  Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip.  Both were heavily fortified and designed to resist attacks by both land and sea.

Many forts at this time in U.S. history were not manned unless a state of alert or war existed.  Ordnance sergeants kept the armament and weaponry in good condition and contracted local labor to see to the upkeep of the grounds and buildings.  This was the state in which Théard found the two river forts on January 10, 1861.  With troops landing at Fort St. Philip on the eastern bank, caretaker Henry Dart surrendered his post at 8:00 p.m. that evening.  Théard left a detachment in charge of the installation and then boarded the YANKEE to move across the river to Fort Jackson where Ordnance Sergeant H. Smith, facing the same situation, also surrendered peacefully.

On that same night, as the river forts were occupied by Théard and his men, state militia under the command of Captain George Clark marched to the northeast from New Orleans.  As Forts St. Philip and Jackson guarded the banks of the Mississippi from enemy approach, so did Forts Pike and Macomb guard the narrow passes at the mouth of Lake Pontchartrain:  Fort Pike on the Rigolets and Fort Macomb on Chef Menteur Pass.  One lonely caretaker looked after each of these forts as well.  With Clark's demand for surrender, Ordnance Sergeant Bosworth had no alternative but to comply.  Fort Pike was lost to the Union as well.

 

Fort Jackson—together with Fort St. Philip—guarded the river approaches to New Orleans. Artwork by D. Spedaliere & S.S. Spedaliere. Courtesy of Osprey Publishing.

Fort Pike guarded the Gulf approach to Lake Pontchartrain on the shores of the Rigolets. Photo courtesy of the Louisiana Office of Tourism.

The following day on January 11, another company of state militia under the command of Captain Charles M. Bradford marched southward from New Orleans to the Army barracks located on the river near the site of General Andrew Jackson's defeat of British troops during the War of 1812.  Captain Bradford demanded and received the surrender of the New Orleans barracks (modern-day Jackson Barracks), but gave no details on the incident in his report.  This seizure, though, would later prove to be an embarrassment for the state.  The U.S. Marine Hospital in New Orleans had been housed at the barracks since 1858 when a flood inundated the hospital's original building on the river's western shore near Algiers.  The only occupants of the barracks at the time of Bradford's seizure were 216 invalids and convalescent patients belonging to the hospital.  When Bradford requested the removal of the patients from the premises, that request was forwarded to U.S. Secretary of the Treasury John A. Dix.

In the space of forty-eight hours, Governor Thomas Overton Moore seized three forts, two barracks, one hospital, and one arsenal with the stores, ammunition, and weaponry that accompanied these installations.  To do so, troops were mustered, armed, and transported via riverboats with arrangements having been made to acquire the use of those boats ahead of time.  No claims of spontaneity or on-the-spot decisions can be made for the Governor or his staff.  The timing of these seizures and the variety of their locations indicates a pre-planned and coordinated attack.  By the time Major Haskins had arranged for passage for his men and marched his men aboard a riverboat headed north out-of-state from Baton Rouge on January 13, Louisiana was well on its way out of the Union and in armed revolt.  And all before the Convention had ever met.

Explaining his actions to the state legislature on January 22, Governor Moore stated:

"She [Louisiana] has a long exposed frontier, on which the Federal Government possesses forts capable of being used for the subjugation of the country and to annul the declared will of the people.  Near this capital, where the delegates of the sovereign people are about to assemble, was a military depot, capable, in unscrupulous hands, of being overawing and restraining the deliberations of a free people. . . .  I decided to take possession of the military posts and munitions of war within the state . . . in order to prevent a collision between Federal troops and the people of the state. . . ."

While the Governor's claim was correct in that the U.S. government could have used the installations to suppress a rebellion should the Convention vote for secession, he conveniently overlooked the fact that the Convention (i.e. the people) had not yet voted to do so and that his actions effectively took the state into open rebellion before they could make their voices heard.  Additionally, only the two barracks and the arsenal offered any Federal personnel of significant number and then only enough to attempt a defense, much less attempting an armed offensive.  The three forts offered a grand total of three ordnance sergeants.  In the Governor's defense, many civic leaders and even common citizens were already organizing military companies of infantry and cavalry predicated on the belief that the Convention would vote for secession.  Such were pitfalls of secession.

The following day on January 23, the one hundred twenty-three delegates called the Convention to order in the Capitol at Baton Rouge.  The next three days were tumultuous as opinions were voiced, points were debated, and resolutions were submitted.  Delegate Charles Bienvenu from Plaquemines offered up a resolution to submit the question of secession to a vote of the people which was narrowly voted down.  Representatives from South Carolina and Alabama weighed in on the discussion, urging secession and the formation of a Southern confederation.  At the height of the debate, Governor Moore read a letter from Louisiana's congressional delegation—U.S. Senators Judah P. Benjamin and John Slidell and Representatives T. G. Davison and John Landrum—that urged secession and the formation of a confederation to oppose a secret military plan developed by General Winfield Scott for the conquest and subjugation of the South.  By the time Catahoula Parish delegate James G. Taliaferro stepped up to the podium, secession was a foregone conclusion.  In his speech, Taliaferro adamantly opposed secession, denied the constitutional right of the state to leave the Union, and systematically tore apart the arguments for secession.  He concluded with a dire prophecy of economic chaos, the loss of prosperity, the burden of massive taxation, anarchy, and ultimately war.  In spite of this, on January 26, 1861, the delegates voted 113 to 17 for secession and Louisiana formally left the Union.

 

Meanwhile, word of Moore's actions had finally reached Washington, D.C., via the Collector at New Orleans.  Secretary of the Treasury John A. Dix, on hearing of Captain Bradford's request to have the patients removed from the Marine Hospital at the New Orleans Barracks, was understandably outraged.  He telegraphed Governor Moore on January 27 to "remonstrate with the Governor against the inhumanity of turning the sick out of the hospital."  A series of communications followed back and forth between Washington, D.C., and Baton Rouge and New Orleans.  Governor Moore assured Dix that the patients would never have been turned out of the hospital and even if the state had needed the immediate use of the barracks, the patients would have been moved and cared for at the Charity Hospital in New Orleans.  He did not, however, apologize for nor back down from the request or the seizure of the barracks.  And though the sick were indeed eventually transferred to Charity Hospital, the northern newspapers lambasted Governor Moore and the State of Louisiana for what the New York Times claimed as the "most unfeeling outrage which has yet been perpetrated by the Disunionists."

U.S. Secretary of the Treasury John A. Dix. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

With the support of the people now behind him, Governor Moore quickly ordered a detachment of the 1^st Regiment of Louisiana Infantry under the command of Lieutenant R. C. Capers to cross the Rigolets and Chef Menteur Pass to take Fort Macomb.  Lieutenant Capers and his troops departed Fort Pike and arrived at its sister fort on January 28.  The caretaker, Ordnance Sergeant D. Wilber, surrendered his post under protest.

Even as Wilber faced armed troops at the doorstep of Fort Macomb, Adjutant General Maurice Grivot was demanding the surrender of all Federal property in New Orleans from the assistant quartermater, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Abraham C. Myers.  As did Haskin in Baton Rouge and the ordnance sergeants at each of the forts, Myers surrendered his post and property peacefully and collected receipts from the Louisiana officials to forward to Washington.  Myers, however, also tendered his resignation from the Army and forwarded it on to his superior in Washington.  He explained his inability to continue his service due to the fact that his home state of South Carolina and now his adopted state of Louisiana had both seceded from the Union.  Many such individuals were soon to face torn allegiances.

January 28 was not an idle day for Grivot.  Moving on, he demanded the surrender of the medical department and property from the U.S. Army surgeon in New Orleans, Dr. S. P. Moore.  Dr. Moore cooperated, but under protest.

The writing was now on the wall for all who were willing to read it.  Brevet 2^nd Lieutenant of Engineers Walter McFarland, U.S. Army, was one of those willing to use his eyes and ears.  Anticipating the seizure of the U.S. Mint in New Orleans, he withdrew $ 543.57 in funds on January 31, 1861.  These funds had been designated for a harbor project on Lake Pontchartrain, but as that project had never been started, the funds had lain idle in the account for several years.  McFarland used these funds to pay local laborers who were yet unpaid for their work in making repairs to Forts Jackson and St. Philip.  As McFarland later explained, he felt that the government would prefer the funds to be in the hands of those who had earned them rather than in the State Treasury.

The following day on February 01, state forces seized the U.S. Mint and the U.S. Customs House.  McFarland had acted in the nick of time.

 

The U.S. Mint in New Orleans as seen circa 1900. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

The U.S. Customs House as seen circa 1861. Illustrations from Harper's Weekly.

The Collector at the New Orleans Mint and the Customs House, a gentleman by the name of F. M. Hatch, was also by a quirk of fate the ex-officio Assistant Treasurer of the United States.  His immediate superior, Secretary of the Treasury John A. Dix, was another individual who could see the writing on the wall.  On January 21, Dix drew a draft of $350,000 from the New Orleans Mint.  Hatch declined to pay out the draft, citing insufficient funds and preferring to pay the draft in full rather than in part.  Dix suspected that this was a delaying tactic so that the funds would not go beyond the reach of the state until the Convention in Baton Rouge had met and voted.  In the meantime, word reached Dix of the seizure of the New Orleans barracks, further confirming his fears.  The delay in payment had the end result that Dix feared.  The state seized the New Orleans Mint on February 01 and approximately $880,000 vanished from the holdings of the United States and entered into the hands of the Louisiana state treasury.  Hatch retained his position as Collector over the Mint and Customs House under the new auspices of the independent State of Louisiana.

Adjutant General Grivot continued his sweep of Federal installations and offices in New Orleans.  On February 02, he demanded the surrender of all property, maps, and plans from the U.S. Engineer Department.  The intrepid Lieutenant McFarland refused to surrender his property to Grivot, stating that he did not have the authority to do so.  He admitted, however, that he did not have the power to retain its possession either.  He left the decision entirely in the hands of Grivot and Governor Moore.  Neither man had any qualms about the matter and the property was confiscated.

In addition to foreseeing the seizure of the Mint, Secretary of the Treasury Dix foresaw another problem of a more military nature.  On January 19, he had ordered W. Hemphill Jones to proceed to New Orleans to take possession of the Federal revenue cutter ROBERT McCLELLAND.  Jones soon arrived in New Orleans but encountered a problem:  Captain J. G. Brushwood of the Revenue Cutter Service (today's U.S. Coast Guard) refused to recognize Jones' authority.  After being advised of the situation by telegraph, Secretary Dix ordered the McCLELLAND's second-in-command, Lieutenant Caldwell, to arrest Captain Brushwood and assume command of the cutter.  Dix instructed Caldwell that if Brushwood attempted to interfere, he was to be treated as a mutineer and "if any one attempted to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot!"  That final order, however, reached Jones and Caldwell too late.  Louisiana officials had already seized the cutter.

The McCLELLAND featured five guns and a crew of thirty-five.  She was transferred to the Confederate States Navy and renamed CSS PICKENS with her former captain, J. G. Brushwood, still in command.

To the southwest, Fort Livingston on Grand Terre Island guarded the "back door" to New Orleans from the Gulf of Mexico.  Lieutenant W. H. Stevens remained in charge of the post through March 02, 1861.  No record has been found showing its seizure.  The Daily Picayune newspaper in New Orleans reported plans on May 01 for state troops to garrison the fort and Confederate reports show the facility occupied by July 12 of that year.  As the Federal blockade began off the mouth of the Mississippi on May 26 and rumors of invasion swirled, troops were sent to garrison some of the minor installations in the area like Battery Bienvenu, Tower Dupre, and the unfinished Fort Proctor.

Louisiana's lighthouses were also Federal installations, though the keepers were usually local citizens paid to watch over the installations.  The jobs were sometimes passed down through the family at times from father to son or even husband to wife.  Several keepers, foreseeing trouble with the arrival of the blockade ships, disassembled their lights and hid the equipment and the fragile and immensely valuable lenses to be retrieved after the conflict had passed.  Other keepers, sympathetic to the Confederate cause, extinguished their lamps to help force the blockade ships further offshore away from dangerous reefs, giving privateers and blockade runners a better chance of escape.

The final, incontrovertible acts of war against the United States had yet to occur.  Collector Hatch would soon refuse to allow goods to pass through the port at New Orleans for destinations upriver in the Union without first paying duties (taxes).  The impeding of free navigation on the Mississippi River—which had been guaranteed by the Louisiana Secession Convention and by the newly formed Confederate Congress—was something that the United States could not tolerate.  It was the sole reason for the Louisiana Purchase in 1803!  Finally, on April 17 of 1861, Confederate President Jefferson Davis issued a call for privateers to take to the seas against Northern shipping.  Louisiana citizens enthusiastically answered the call, sailing from New Orleans the following month.

Though not openly declared in January in spite of Governor Moore's acts of aggression, Louisiana was now at war with her sister states.  The Civil War had finally, inevitably begun.

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Sources used in the compilation of this article:

The American Pageant by Thomas A. Bailey & David M. Kennedy.  D.C. Heath & Company (1987).

The Capture of New Orleans, 1862, by Chester G. Hearn.  Louisiana State University Press (1995).
The Civil War in Louisiana, by John D. Winters.  Louisiana State University Press (1963).
Dark and Bloody Ground:  The Battle of Mansfield and the Forgotten Civil War in Louisiana, by Thomas Ayres. 

          Taylor Trade Publishing.  (2001).

Encyclopedia of Forts, Posts, Named Camps, and Other Military Installations in Louisiana, 1700-1981, by

          Powell A. Casey.  Claitor's Publishing Division (1983).

History of the Confederate States Navy, by J. Thomas Sharf.  The Fairfax Press (1977).

Louisiana:  A History, edited by Bennett H. Wall.  The Forum Press (1984).

The Night the War Was Lost, by Charles L. Dufour.  Doubleday & Company, Inc. (1960).

The War of the Rebellion:  A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,

          Secretary of War.  128 vols.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO (1880-1901).

**Copyright 1997-2011 by Louisiana Naval War Memorial Commission**